On the illusion of neuroscience's epiphenomena

Emergent properties — those arising from the interactions of simpler units which do not individually possess the characteristics which they can exhibit as a collective — define neuroscience. One could not argue that the single-celled bacterium, for instance, is conscious. Although we may be fooled, every movement and action of the organism is the result of incredibly complex (yet relatively simple) chemical reactions, with its genetics assuring that the appropriate molecules are present at the appropriate instant and concentration such that the existence of the bacterium and its offspring is perpetuated.

What if we extend this concept to simple multicellular creatures with a nervous system, such as the nematode, who possesses only several hundred neurons. Still, their functions are completely characterized by chemical reactions, though on a larger scale than the bacterium, such that it becomes easier to refer to their behaviors with a description of neural activity and activation. Next, the vertebrate, such as your dog or cat. Their actions are again dictated by chemical reactions, though far more complex, to an extent that it becomes easier to reference their behavior with emergent properties than to describe every individual neural signal, as we could with the nematode.

Lastly, the human, who is of course programmed to believe that a distinction exists between their brain and mind. In reality, just as with every other piece of life on Earth and in the physical universe (as if there were any other universe outside of human imagination), we are governed by an incomprehensible complexity of chemical reactions which account for every action and thought. However, to study ourselves at this level with modern technology would be absurd; thus, we reference emergent properties that we observe from the activity of our neurons (and other cell types) as a collective.

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